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—Sympos ium— 
National Security, National 
Origin, and the Constitution: 75 
Years After Executive        
Order 9066 
Introduction 
Jonathan L. Entin† 
On February 19, 1942, just over two months after the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 
9066.1 That order provided the legal authority for the internment of 
Japanese American residents of the West Coast during World War II.2 
Four cases involving these events reached the Supreme Court: 
Hirabayashi v. United States,3 Yasui v. United States,4 Korematsu v. 
United States,5 and Ex parte Endo.6 The Court did not question the 
legality of the executive order in any of those cases.7 
 
†  David L. Brennan Professor Emeritus of Law and Political Science, Case 
Western Reserve University. 
1. 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942), 3 C.F.R. 1092 (Cum. Supp. 1943). 
2. One of the most enthusiastic proponents of the internment program was 
California Attorney General Earl Warren, who would be elected governor 
later that year. See Ed Cray, Chief Justice: A Biography of Earl 
Warren 114–23 (1997); Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief: Earl 
Warren and His Supreme Court—A Judicial Biography 14–17 
(1983); G. Edward White, Earl Warren: A Public Life 69–72, 74–75 
(1982); Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: 
Earl Warren, Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. 
Rev./19 B.C. Third World L.J. 73, 89–94, 99–105 (1998). 
3. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
4. 320 U.S. 115 (1943). 
5. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
6. 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
7. The Endo Court held that Executive Order 9066 and its implementing 
orders and legislation did not authorize the detention of a “concededly 
loyal” citizen of Japanese descent. Id. at 297. The Court upheld the 
government’s position in the other three cases. Gordon Hirabayashi and 
Minoru Yasui had been arrested for violating a military curfew in 
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But the treatment of Japanese Americans was controversial even 
at the time. Justice Black’s law clerk began his bench memo in 
Korematsu as follows: “This is a damned Fascist outrage.”8 And 
Professor Eugene Rostow of the Yale Law School published a 
withering contemporaneous critique of these decisions.9 More recently, 
the cases arising from Executive Order 9066—especially Korematsu—
have fallen into extraordinary judicial and scholarly disrepute.10 
The tension between national security and civil liberties was not 
confined to World War II. We have seen similar issues throughout 
American history. For example, President Lincoln suspended habeas 
corpus during the Civil War,11 and federal authorities imposed restric-
tions on the press and brought critics and Confederate sympathizers 
before military commissions.12 
 
designated areas on the West Coast. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83–84; Yasui, 
320 U.S. at 116–17. Fred Korematsu remained in his home in defiance of 
an evacuation order. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215–16. Mitsuye Endo had 
gone to an internment camp but sought permission to return to her home. 
Endo, 323 U.S. at 284–85, 293–94. 
8. John P. Frank, The Shelf Life of Justice Hugo L. Black, 1997 Wis. L. 
Rev. 1, 14. Not that this assessment had any impact: Justice Black wrote 
the majority opinion upholding the government’s action. Korematsu, 323 
U.S. at 215. Nevertheless, Mr. Frank, the law clerk who wrote that 
impassioned bench memo, went on to a distinguished career as a scholar-
practitioner. See Jonathan L. Entin, In Memoriam: John P. Frank 
(November 10, 1917–September 7, 2002), 53 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 239 
(2002). His final publication appeared in these pages. See John P. Frank, 
Book Review, 53 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 243 (2002) (reviewing John W. 
Dean, The Rehnquist Choice (2001)). 
9. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 Yale 
L.J. 489 (1945). 
10. Virtually all recent Supreme Court justices have denounced Korematsu. 
See David A. Harris, On the Contemporary Meaning of Korematsu: 
“Liberty Lies in the Hearts of Men and Women,” 76 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 10 
n.42 (2011) (citing examples); Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, 
Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104 W. Va. L. Rev. 571, 586 n.75 
(2002) (citing other examples). On the scholarly view of Korematsu, see 
Harris, supra, at 9 n.40 (collecting examples). 
11. Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and 
Civil Liberties 4–11, 32, 37, 51–65, 68–74, 90–91 (1991); Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime—From the 
Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism 85, 88, 120–21 
(2004). 
12. Neely, supra note 11, at 14–18, 26–29, 65–68, 104; Stone, supra note 11, 
at 82, 124–28. After the Civil War, the Supreme Court held that civilians 
could not be tried before military tribunals if the civil courts remained 
available. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). But Milligan had 
only limited impact in later years. Neely, supra note 11, at 178–84. 
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The federal government likewise showed little sympathy for oppo-
nents of American involvement in World War I. Rejecting an effort to 
prevent the mailing of a left-wing magazine, Learned Hand warned 
against “the suppression of all hostile criticism, and of all opinion ex-
cept what encouraged and supported the existing policies,”13 but he 
was promptly reversed by a higher court.14 And the Supreme Court 
upheld convictions of war critics whether prominent or obscure. In 
Schenck v. United States,15 Justice Holmes explained: “When a nation 
is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a 
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long 
as men fight and . . . no Court could regard them as protected by any 
constitutional right.”16 A week later, in Debs v. United States,17 
Holmes wrote an even briefer opinion that gave short shrift to the 
First Amendment.18 To be sure, Justice Holmes soon came to take a 
more speech-protective view, starting with his dissent in Abrams v. 
United States.19 And the Court eventually recognized, in Dennis v. 
United States,20 that this view had essentially prevailed.21 
Nevertheless, Dennis rejected a First Amendment defense to con-
spiracy charges against a dozen leaders of the Communist Party.22 
And during the first decade of the Cold War, the Court generally 
deferred to the government in cases challenging aggressive loyalty-se-
curity programs.23 But beginning in 1957, the Court narrowly con-
strued the statute under which the government prosecuted members 
of the Communist Party to require a showing that members knew of 
 
13. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
14. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). 
15. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
16. Id. at 52. 
17. 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
18. For detailed discussion of this case, see Melvin I. Urofsky, The Trial of 
Eugene V. Debs, 1918, in Justice and Legal Change on the Shores 
of Lake Erie: A History of the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Ohio 97 (Paul Finkelman & Roberta 
Sue Alexander eds., 2012). 
19. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
20. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
21. Id. at 507 (observing that “there is little doubt that subsequent opinions 
have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis rationale”). 
22. Id. at 517. 
23. See Stone, supra note 11, at 411–13; see also Bailey v. Richardson, 182 
F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (rejecting a federal employee’s due process 
challenge to her dismissal under a loyalty-security program), aff’d by an 
equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). 
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an organization’s advocacy of violent revolution and had the specific 
intent to promote that goal.24 
During the Vietnam War, the Supreme Court upheld a statute 
prohibiting the destruction of draft cards in a case involving a young 
man who burned his draft card to protest the war.25 But the Court 
also ruled that the federal government could not enjoin the public-
cation of the Pentagon Papers, a classified Defense Department study 
of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia;26 that public school students 
had a First Amendment right to protest the war so long as their 
actions did not substantially disrupt the educational process;27 and 
that an opponent of the war could not be prosecuted merely for bring-
ing a jacket emblazoned with “Fuck the Draft” into a courtroom.28 
The attacks on September 11, 2001, followed by U.S. military in-
tervention in both Afghanistan and Iraq, have raised additional con-
cerns about the relationship between national security and civil liber-
ties.29 Those events have generated widespread litigation and numer-
ous judicial rulings.30 More recently, President Trump’s proposed ban 
on travel to this country from several predominantly Muslim nations 
as part of a policy designed to protect against further acts of terror-
ism has generated widespread controversy and litigation.31 
In the seventy-fifth anniversary year of Executive Order 9066, the 
editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review organized a sym-
posium to explore the perennial tensions between national security 
and civil liberties. The symposium took place on November 17, 2017, 
and brought together speakers from several disciplines and a wide 
 
24. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 
354 U.S. 298 (1957); see also Stone, supra note 11, at 415–16. 
25. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
26. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
27. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
28. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
29. The first Persian Gulf War did not last long enough to generate as much in 
the way of case law, at least at the federal level. But see State v. Lessin, 
620 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio 1993) (overturning the conviction of a demonstrator 
who burned an American flag to protest the war). 
30. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 
U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
31. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017); Trump v. Int’l Refugee 
Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. 
Trump, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, No. 
17–1194 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2018); Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 
2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) (No. 17–965). 
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range of viewpoints. This issue contains papers that were presented on 
that occasion.32 
Geoffrey Stone, a leading scholar of the Constitution and author 
of a panoramic chronicle of civil liberties and national security,33 pro-
vides a broad overview to open this symposium issue.34 He examines 
the background that led to the promulgation of Executive Order 9066, 
including the debate within the Roosevelt Administration over the 
wisdom and propriety of moving against Japanese Americans, fol-
lowed by an account of Hirabayashi and Korematsu, focusing particu-
larly on what we know about the Supreme Court’s internal consid-
eration of those cases. He goes on to address the aftermath of the 
internment, from the ending of that program to the long process that 
culminated in belated compensation to internees.35 Finally, he comes 
full circle by noting that the federal courts eventually vacated the 
convictions of Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu.36 But the 
story does not end there—Professor Stone concludes with an account 
of how he came to submit an amicus curiae brief on behalf of 
Korematsu to the Supreme Court in one of the post-September 11 
cases. 
Professor Stone’s personal conclusion sets the stage for the paper 
by documentary producer and film-maker Frank Abe, who was born 
in Cleveland because the government moved his parents here in the 
wake of Endo.37 Eventually his family moved to California, where his 
parents had been born and raised. But only when he got to college did 
he come to understand that his parents had been interned during 
World War II. It turns out that his experience was typical: Nisei 
 
32. Video recordings of the program are available at National Security, 
National Origin, and the Constitution: 75 Years After Executive Order 
9066, Case W. Res. U. Sch. L., https://law.case.edu/Lectures-Events/ 
EventId/324/e/national-security-national-origin-and-the-constitution-75-
years-after-executive-order-9066-17-nov-2017 [https://perma.cc/V7US-
LUCY] (last visited Apr. 18, 2018). 
33. See Stone, supra note 11. 
34. Geoffrey R. Stone, National Security, National Origin, and the 
Constitution: 75 Years After EO9066, 68 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1067 
(2018). 
35. Act of Aug. 10, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified at 50 
U.S.C. app. §§ 1989–1989d (2012)). 
36. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v. 
United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); see also Yasui v. 
United States, 772 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that a district 
court had granted the government’s motion to vacate the conviction of 
Minoru Yasui). 
37. Frank Abe, Resistance, Resettlement, and Redress, 68 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 1085 (2018). 
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parents generally did not tell their Sansei children much about what 
had happened to them in the camps.38 This belated discovery of his 
parents’ story and that of thousands of others motivated him to learn 
more about the internment and to document the experience of the 
people who went through it. 
The next paper broadens the time frame by focusing on World 
War I. Specifically, David Forte examines the case of Eugene V. Debs, 
who was convicted of obstructing the military in connection with an 
antiwar speech that he gave in Canton, Ohio, in June 1918.39 
Professor Forte focuses on the details of the case, but he also con-
siders the strikingly different approaches taken by President Woodrow 
Wilson, whose administration vigorously prosecuted Debs, and 
President Warren G. Harding, who commuted Debs’ ten-year prison 
sentence.40 
Peter Margulies brings the focus to the present, addressing the re-
lief available to victims of governmental overreach in national security 
cases.41 This issue arose only obliquely in the World War II intern-
ment cases; only many years later did the federal government com-
pensate some of those whose rights had been violated.42 But it has 
taken on greater significance in the period after September 11, as the 
federal government has taken more aggressive actions to prevent fur-
ther acts of domestic terrorism. Professor Margulies criticizes the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi,43 which rejected a 
constitutional tort claim brought by immigration detainees who had 
been placed in high-security detention facilities despite any 
meaningful evidence that they had ties to terrorism. That decision 
strengthened the barriers to constitutional claims against high-level 
executive officials that were announced in Iqbal v. Ashcroft.44 He 
 
38. Karen Korematsu learned of her father’s experience only in her high school 
history class; her parents had never told her anything about what had 
happened. See Karen Korematsu’s Interview Answers, Fred T. 
Korematsu Inst., http://www.korematsuinstitute.org/karen-korematsus-
frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/K7L6-BK59] (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2018). 
39. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
40. David F. Forte, Righting a Wrong: Warren G. Harding and the Espionage 
Act Prosecutions, 68 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1097 (2018). 
41. Peter Margulies, Curbing Remedies for Official Wrongs: The Need for 
Bivens Suits in National Security Cases, 68 Case W. Res. L. 1153 Rev. 
(2018). 
42. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
43. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
44. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Iqbal in turn built on the plausibility standard of 
pleading that the Supreme Court previously established in Bell Atlantic 
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recognizes that the plaintiffs in Abbasi and Iqbal generally were not 
legally in the country and therefore were subject to immigration en-
forcement action, whereas the parties who challenged the World War 
II internment were either U.S. citizens or lawful residents, but he 
emphasizes that the Constitution applies to all persons physically 
present in the country regardless of their citizenship or immigration 
status. He argues that damages are an appropriate remedy for consti-
tutional violations and that the Abbasi Court proceeded from an 
erroneous presumption against remedies in concluding that damage 
actions for constitutional violations were not available except in very 
limited circumstances. 
In the final article in this symposium, Robert Chang offers the 
broadest historical sweep in the issue.45 He contends that the legal 
arguments supporting contemporary efforts to restrict entry of persons 
from certain countries into the United States can be traced to the 
Chinese Exclusion Case.46 This case provides an important foundation 
for the so-called plenary power doctrine, which requires the judiciary 
to defer to immigration and naturalization decisions made by the po-
litical branches. And Korematsu and the other World War II intern-
ment cases suggest that the federal government has authority to 
single out citizens of a particular nation for disfavored treatment in 
the interest of national security. Professor Chang traces the develop-
ment and evolution of the plenary power doctrine, which he charac-
terizes as immigration exceptionalism, as well as judicial deference to 
the political branches in national security cases, which he refers to as 
national security exceptionalism. Although the arguments for national 
security exceptionalism ultimately rest on precedents such as the 
Chinese Exclusion Case and Korematsu, the government and other 
advocates of judicial deference rarely acknowledge the jurisprudential 
roots of their position, even when citing other precedents that do rely 
on those cases. 
There is one more symposium-related item in this issue, an amicus 
curiae brief that was submitted to the Supreme Court in Trump v. 
Hawaii,47 the latest round in the litigation over the president’s travel 
ban.48 Among the amici on whose behalf this brief was filed are Karen 
 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), which has had broad ramifications 
for all civil litigation. 
45. Robert S. Chang, Whitewashing Precedent: From the Chinese Exclusion 
Case to Korematsu to the Muslim Travel Ban Cases, 68 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 1183 (2018). 
46. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
47. 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) (No. 17–965), granting cert. to 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 
2017). 
48. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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Korematsu, Jay Hirabayashi, and Holly Yasui, children of litigants 
who unsuccessfully challenged the Japanese internment during World 
War II.49 The brief contends that the government’s arguments sup-
porting the travel ban echo those that succeeded in the internment 
cases and urges the Court to avoid repeating the judicial errors that 
gave rise to those rulings.50 
This symposium would not have been possible without the assis-
tance of many individuals and entities. First, Deans Jessica W. Berg 
and Michael P. Scharf provided enthusiastic institutional support at 
every stage. Thanks to them for their continuing encouragement. 
Second, the symposium was co-sponsored by the Institute for Global 
Security Law and Policy, part of the law school’s Frederick K. Cox 
International Law Center, and by the Inamori International Center 
for Ethics and Excellence of Case Western Reserve University. 
Thanks to Professor Avidan Y. Cover, director of the Institute, and 
Professor Shannon E. French, director of the Inamori Center. Third, 
the symposium also received a grant from the Attorney Admissions 
Fund of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio. We very much appreciate the court’s support. 
Kudos also to two editors of the Case Western Reserve Law 
Review for their outstanding work on the live symposium and this 
issue: Michael Silverstein, symposium editor, and James Bedell, 
editor-in-chief. They have worked indefatigably to make this project a 
success. 
Last, but by no means least, Aylin Drabousky provided remark-
able staff support that went well beyond the call of duty in making 
sure that the symposium went smoothly. 
 
49. See supra note 7. This is not the first time that descendants of a litigant in 
leading civil rights cases have filed an amicus curiae brief. See Brief of the 
Family of Heman Sweatt as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (No. 11–345) (filed on behalf 
of the daughter and nephews of Heman Marion Sweatt, the successful 
plaintiff in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), which invalidated the 
whites-only admissions policy at the University of Texas Law School, in a 
case challenging the race-based affirmative action admissions policies of the 
University of Texas). 
50. Brief of Karen Korematsu et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17–965, 68 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
1237 (2018). 
